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Abstract. We propose an algorithm for computing an isogeny between
two elliptic curves E1, E2 defined over a finite field such that there is an
imaginary quadratic order O satisfying O ≃ End(Ei) for i = 1, 2. This
concerns ordinary curves and supersingular curves defined over Fp (the
latter used in the recent CSIDH proposal). Our algorithm has heuris-
tic asymptotic run time e
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
and requires polynomial quantum
memory and e
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
classical memory, where ∆ is the discriminant
of O. This asymptotic complexity outperforms all other available method
for computing isogenies.
We also show that a variant of our method has asymptotic run time
e
O˜
(√
log(|∆|)
)
while requesting only polynomial memory (both quantum
and classical).
1 Introduction
Given two elliptic curves E1, E2 defined over a finite field Fq, the isogeny prob-
lem is to compute an isogeny φ : E1 → E2, i.e. a non-constant morphism that
maps the identity point on E1 to the identity point on E2. There are two dif-
ferent types of elliptic curves: ordinary and supersingular. The latter have very
particular properties that impact the resolution of the isogeny problem. The
first instance of a cryptosystem based on the hardness of computing isogenies
was due to Couveignes [12], and its concept was independently rediscovered by
Stolbunov [31]. Both proposals used ordinary curves.
Childs, Jao and Soukharev observed in [11] that the problem of finding an
isogeny between two ordinary curves E1, E2 defined over Fq and having the same
endomorphism ring could be reduced to the problem of finding a subgroup of
the dihedral group. More specifically, let K = Q(
√
t2 − 4q) where t is the trace
of the Frobenius endomorphism of the curves, and let O ⊆ K be the quadratic
order isomorphic to the ring of endomorphisms of E1 and E2. Let Cl(O) be the
ideal class group of O. Classes of ideals act on isomorphism classes of curves with
endomorphism ring isomorphic toO. Finding an isogeny between E1 and E2 boils
down to finding an ideal a such that [a]∗E1 = E2 where ∗ is the action of Cl(O),
[a] is the class of a in Cl(O) and Ei is the isomorphism class of the curve Ei.
Childs, Jao and Soukharev showed that this could be done by finding a subgroup
of Z2 ⋉ ZN , where N = #Cl(O) ∼
√|t2 − 4q|. Using Kuperberg’s sieve [25],
this requires 2
O
(√
log(N)
)
queries to an oracle that computes the action of the
class of an ideal a. Childs et al. used a method with complexity in 2
O˜
(√
log(N)
)
to evaluate this oracle, meaning that the total cost is 2
O˜
(√
log(N)
)
.
To avoid this subexponential attack, Jao and De Feo [21] described an ana-
logue of these isogeny-based systems that works with supersingular curves. The
endomorphism ring of such curves is a maximal order in a quaternion alge-
bra. The non-commutativity of the (left)-ideals acting on isomorphism classes
of curves thwarts the attacks mentioned above, but it also restricts the possi-
bilities offered by supersingular isogenies, which are typically used for a Diffie-
Hellman type of key exchange (known as SIDH) and for digital signatures. Most
recently, two independent works revisited isogeny-based cryptosystems by re-
stricting themselves to cases where the subexponential attacks based on the
action of Cl(O) was applicable. The scheme known as CSIDH by Castryck et
al. [10] uses supersingular curves and isogenies defined over Fp, while the scheme
of De Feo, Kieffer and Smith [14] uses ordinary curves with many practical opti-
mizations. In both cases, the appeal of using commutative structures is to allow
more functionalities, such as static-static key exchange protocols that are not
possible with SIDH without an expensive Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [2]. The
downside is that one needs to carefully assess the hardness of the computation
of isogenies in this context.
Contribution. Let E1, E2 be two elliptic curves defined over a finite field such
that there is an imaginary quadratic order O satisfying O ≃ End(Ei) for i = 1, 2
and ∆ = disc(O). In this note, we provide new insight regarding the security of
CSIDH as follows:
1. We describe a quantum algorithm for computing an isogeny between E1 and
E2 with heuristic asymptotic run time in e
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
and with quantum
memory in Poly (log(|∆|)) and quantumly accessible classical memory in
e
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
.
2. We show that we can use a variant of this method to compute an isogeny be-
tween E1 and E2 in time e
(
1√
2
+o(1)
)√
ln(|∆|) ln ln(|∆|)
with polynomial memory
(both classical and quantum).
Our contributions bear similarities to the recent independent work of Bonnetain
and Schrottenloher [7]. The main differences are that they rely on a generat-
ing set l1, . . . , lu where u ∈ Θ(log(|∆|)) of the class group provided with the
CSIDH protocol, and that their approach does not have asymptotic run time in
e
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
. The asymptotic run time of the method of [7] was not analyzed.
However, using similar techniques as the ones presented in this paper, one could
conclude that the run time of the method of [7] is in e
O˜
(√
log(|∆|)
)
. The extra
logarithmic factors in the exponent come from the use of the BKZ reduction [28]
with block size in O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
in a lattice of Zu. Section 4.2 elaborates on
the differences between our algorithm and [7]. The run time of the variant de-
scribed in Contribution 2 is asymptotically comparable to that of the algorithm
of Childs, Jao and Soukharev [11], and to that of Bonnetain and Schrottenlo-
her [7] (if its exact time complexity was to be worked out). The main appeal
of our variant is the fact that it uses a polynomial amount of memory, which is
likely to impact the performances in practice.
2 Mathematical background
An elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fq of characteristic p 6= 2, 3 is an
algebraic variety given by an equation of the form E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b, where
a, b ∈ Fq and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. A more general form gives an affine model in the
case p = 2, 3 but it is not useful in the scope of this paper since we derive an
asymptotic result. The set of points of an elliptic curve can be equipped with an
additive group law. Details about the arithmetic of elliptic curves can be found
in many references, such as [30, Chap. 3].
Let E1, E2 be two elliptic curves defined over Fq. An isogeny φ : E1 → E2 is a
non-constant rational map defined over Fq which is also a group homomorphism
from E1 to E2. Two curves are isogenous over Fq if and only if they have the same
number of points over Fq (see [33]). Two curves over Fq are said to be isomorphic
over Fq if there is an Fq-isomorphism between their group of points. Two such
curves have the same j-invariant given by j := 1728 4a
3
4a3+27b2 . In this paper, we
treat isogenies as mappings between (representatives of) Fq-isomorphism classes
of elliptic curves. In other words, given two j-invariants j1, j2 ∈ Fq, we wish to
construct an isogeny between (any) two elliptic curves E1, E2 over Fq having j-
invariant j1 (respectively j2). Such an isogeny exists if and only if Φℓ(j1, j2) = 0
for some ℓ, where Φℓ(X,Y ) is the ℓ-th modular polynomial.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq. An isogeny between E and itself
defined over Fqn for some n > 0 is called an endomorphism of E. The set of
endomorphisms of E is a ring that we denote by End(E). For each integer m,
the multiplication-by-mmap [m] on E is an endomorphism. Therefore, we always
have Z ⊆ End(E). Moreover, to each isogeny φ : E1 → E2 corresponds an isogeny
φ̂ : E2 → E1 called its dual isogeny. It satisfies φ ◦ φ̂ = [m] where m = deg(φ).
For elliptic curves defined over a finite field, we know that Z ( End(E). In this
particular case, End(E) is either an order in an imaginary quadratic field (and
has Z-rank 2) or an order in a quaternion algebra ramified at p (the characteristic
of the base field) and ∞ (and has Z-rank 4). In the former case, E is said to
be ordinary while in the latter it is called supersingular. When a supersingular
curve is defined over Fp, then the ring of its Fp-endomorphisms is isomorphic to
an imaginary quadratic order, much like in the ordinary case.
An order O in a field K such that [K : Q] = n is a subring of K which is a
Z-module of rank n. The notion of ideal of O can be generalized to fractional
ideals, which are sets of the form a = 1dI where I is an ideal of O and d ∈ Z>0.
The invertible fractional ideals form a multiplicative group I, having a subgroup
consisting of the invertible principal ideals P . The ideal class group Cl(O) is by
definition Cl(O) := I/P . In Cl(O), we identify two fractional ideals a, b if there
is α ∈ K such that b = (α)a. We denote by [a] the class of the fractional ideal a in
Cl(O). The ideal class group is finite and its cardinality is called the class number
hO of O. For a quadratic order O, the class number satisfies hO ≤
√|∆| ln(|∆|),
where ∆ is the discriminant of O.
The endomorphism ring of an elliptic curve plays a crucial role in most algo-
rithms for computing isogenies between curves. The class group of End(E) acts
transitively on isomorphism classes of elliptic curves (that is, on j-invariants
of curves) having the same endomorphism ring. More precisely, the class of an
ideal a ⊆ O acts on the isomorphism class of a curve E with End(E) ≃ O
via an isogeny of degree N (a) (the algebraic norm of a). Likewise, each isogeny
ϕ : E → E′ where End(E) = End(E′) ≃ O corresponds (up to isomorphism) to
the class of an ideal in O. From an ideal a and the ℓ-torsion (where ℓ = N (a)),
one can recover the kernel of ϕ, and then using Ve´lu’s formulae [34], one can de-
rive the corresponding isogeny. We denote by [a] ∗E the action of the ideal class
of a on the isomorphism class of the curve E. The typical strategy to evaluate
the action of [a] is to decompose it as a product of classes of prime ideals of small
norm, and evaluate the action of each prime ideals as ℓ-isogenies. This strategy
was first described by Couveignes [12] and later by Bro¨ker-Charles-Lauter [9]
and reused in many subsequent works.
Notation: In this paper, log denotes the base 2 logarithm while ln denotes the
natural logarithm.
3 The CSIDH static-static key exchange
As pointed out in [15], the original SIDH key agreement protocol is not secure
when using the same secret over multiple instances of the protocol. This can
be fixed by a Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [2] at the cost of a drastic loss of
performance, requiring additional points in the protocol, and loss of flexibility,
for example, the inability to reuse keys. These issues motivated the description
of CSIDH [10] which uses supersingular curves defined over Fp.
When Alice and Bob wish to create a shared secret, they rely on their long-
term secrets [a] and [b] which are classes of ideals in the ideal class group of O,
where O is isomorphic to the Fp-endomorphism ring of a supersingular curve E
defined over Fp. Much like the original Diffie-Hellman protocol [13], Alice and
Bob proceed as follow:
– Alice sends [a] ∗ E to Bob.
– Bob sends [b] ∗ E to Alice.
Then Alice and Bob can separately recover their shared secret
[ab] ∗ E = [b] ∗ [a] ∗ E = [a] ∗ [b] ∗ E.
The existence of a quantum subexponential attack forces the use of larger keys for
the same level of security, which is partly compensated by the fact that elements
are represented in Fp, and are thus more compact. Recommended parameter
sizes and attack costs from [10] for 80, 128, and 256 bit security are listed in
Table 1.
Table 1. Claimed security of CSIDH [10, Table 1].
NIST log(p) Cost quantum attack Cost classical attack
1 512 262 2128
3 1024 294 2256
5 1792 2129 2448
4 Asymptotic complexity of isogeny computation
In this section, we show how to combine the general framework for computing
isogenies between curves whose endomorphism ring is isomorphic to a quadratic
order (due to Childs, Jao and Soukharev [11] in the ordinary case and to Biasse
Jao and Sankar in the supersingular case [5]) with the efficient evaluation of
the class group action of Biasse, Fieker and Jacobson [4] to produce a quantum
algorithm that finds an isogeny between E1, E2. We give two variants of our
method:
– Heuristic time complexity 2O(log(|∆|)), polynomial quantum memory and
quantumly accessible classical memory in 2O(log(|∆|)).
– Heuristic time complexity e
(
1√
2
+o(1)
)√
ln(|∆|) ln ln(|∆|)
with polynomial mem-
ory (both classical and quantum).
4.1 Isogenies from solutions to the Hidden Subgroup Problem
As shown in [5,11], the computation of an isogeny between E1 and E2 such that
there is an imaginary quadratic order with O ≃ End(Ei) for i = 1, 2 can be done
by exploiting the action of the ideal class group of O on isomorphism classes of
curves with endomorphism ring isomorphic to O. In particular, this concerns the
cases of
– ordinary curves, and
– supersingular curves defined over Fp.
Assume we are looking for a such that [a] ∗E1 = E2. Let A = Z/d1Z× · · · ×
Z/dkZ ≃ Cl(O) be the elementary decomposition of Cl(O). Then we define a
quantum oracle on Z/2Z⋉A by
f(x, y) :=
{ |[ay] ∗ E1〉 if x = 0,
|[ay] ∗ E2〉 if x = 1, (1)
where [ay] is the element of Cl(O) corresponding to y ∈ A via the isomor-
phism Cl(O) ≃ A. Let H be the subgroup of Z/2Z ⋉ A of the periods of
f . This means that f(x, y) = f(x′, y′) if and only if (x, y) − (x′, y′) ∈ H .
Then H = {(0, 0), (1, s)} where s ∈ A such that [as] ∗ E1 = E2. The com-
putation of s can thus be done through the resolution of the Hidden Sub-
group Problem in Z/2Z ⋉ A. In [11, Appendix A], Childs, Jao and Soukharev
generalized the subexponential-time polynomial space dihedral HSP algorithm
of Regev [27] to the case of an arbitrary Abelian group A. Its run time is
in e(
√
2+o(1))
√
ln(|A|) ln ln(|A|) with a polynomial memory requirement. Kuper-
berg [25] describes a family of algorithms, one of which has running time in
e
O
(√
log(|A|)
)
while requiring polynomial quantum memory and e
O
(√
log(|A|)
)
quantumly accessible classical memory. The high-level approach for finding an
isogeny from the dihedral HSP is skteched in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Quantum algorithm for finding the action in Cl(O)
Input: Elliptic curves E1, E2, imaginary quadratic order O such that End(Ei) ≃ O
for i = 1, 2 such that there is [a] ∈ Cl(O) satisfying [a] ∗ E1 = E2.
Output: [a]
1: Compute A = Z/d1Z× · · · × Z/dkZ such that A ≃ Cl(O).
2: Find H = {(0, 0), (1, s)} by solving the HSP in Z/2Z ⋉A with oracle (1).
3: return [as]
Proposition 1. Let N = #Cl(O) ∼√|∆|. Algorithm 1 is correct and requires:
– e
O
(√
log(N)
)
queries to the oracle defined by (1) while requiring a Poly(log(N))
quantum memory overhead and e
O
(√
log(N)
)
quantumly accessible classi-
cal memory overhead when using Kuperberg’s second dihedral HSP algo-
rithm [25] in Step 2.
– e(
√
2+o(1))
√
ln(|N |) ln ln(|N |) queries to the oracle defined by (1) while requir-
ing only polynomial memory overhead when using the dihedral HSP method
ofusing [11, Appendix A] in Step 2.
Remark 1. Algorithm 1 only returns the ideal class [a] whose action on E1 gives
us E2. This is all we are interested in as far as the analysis of isogeny-based
cryptosystems goes. However, this is not technically an isogeny between E1 and
E2. We can use this ideal to derive an actual isogeny by evaluating the action
of [a] using the oracle of Section 4.2 together with the method of [9, Alg. 4.1].
This returns an isogeny φ : E1 → E2 as a composition of isogenies of small
degree φ =
∏
i φ
ei
i without increasing the time complexity. Also note that the
output fits in polynomial space if the product is not evaluated, otherwise, it
needs 2
O˜
(
3
√
log(N)
)
memory.
4.2 The quantum oracle
To compute the oracle defined in (1), Childs, Jao and Soukharev [11] used a
purely classical subexponential method deriving from the general subexponential
class group computation algorithm of Hafner and McCurley [17]. This approach,
mentioned in [10], was first suggested by Couveignes [12]. In a recent independent
work [7], Bonnetain and Schrottenloher used a method that bears similarities
with our oracle described in this section. They combined a quantum algorithm
for computing the class group with classical methods from Biasse, Fieker and
Jacobson [4, Alg. 7] for evaluating the action of [a] with a precomputation of
Cl(O). More specifically, let l1, . . . , lu be prime ideals used to create the long
term secret a of Alice. This means that there are (small) (e1, . . . , eu) ∈ Zu such
that a =
∏
i l
ei
i . Let L be the lattice of exponent vectors (f1, . . . , fu) such that∏
i l
fi
i = (α) for some α in the field of fractions of O. In other words, the ideal
class
[∏
i l
fi
i
]
is the neutral element of Cl(O). The high-level approach used in [7]
deriving from [4, Alg. 7] is the following:
1. Compute a basis B for L.
2. Find a BKZ-reduced basis B′ of L.
3. Find (h1, . . . , hu) ∈ Zu such that [a] =
[∏
i l
hi
i
]
.
4. Use Babai’s nearest plane method on B′ to find short (h′1, . . . , h
′
u) ∈ Zu such
that [a] =
[∏
i l
h′i
i
]
.
5. Evaluate the action of
[∏
i l
h′i
i
]
on E1 by applying the action of the li for
i = 1, . . . , u.
Steps 1 and 2 can be performed as a precomputation. Step 1 takes quantum
polynomial time by using standard techniques for solving an instance of the
Hidden Subgroup Problem in Zu where u satisfies p = 4l1 · · · lu − 1 for small
primes l1, . . . , lu.
The oracle of Childs, Jao and Soukharev [11] has asymptotic time complexity
in 2
O˜
(√
log(|∆|)
)
and requires subexponential space due to the need for the stor-
age of a relation matrix of subexponential dimension. The oracle of Bonnetain
and Schrottenloher [7] relies on BKZ [28] lattice reduction in a lattice in Zu.
Typically, u ∈ Θ(log(p)) = Θ(log(|∆|)), since∑q≤l log(q) ∈ Θ(l). In addition to
not having a proven space complexity bound, the complexity of BKZ cannot be
in e
O˜
(√
log(|∆|)
)
unless the block size is at least in Θ
(√
log(|∆|)
)
, which forces
the overall complexity to be at best in e
O˜
(√
log(|∆|)
)
.
Our strategy differs from that of Bonnetain and Schrottenloher on the fol-
lowing points:
– Our algorithm does not require the basis l1, . . . , lu provided with CSIDH.
– The complexity of our oracle is in e
O˜
(
3
√
log(|∆|)
)
(instead of e
O˜
(√
log(|∆|)
)
for the method of [7]), thus leading to an overall complexity of e
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
(instead of e
O˜
(√
log(|∆|)
)
for the method of [7]).
– We specify the use of a variant of BKZ with a proven poly-space complexity.
To avoid the dependence on the parameter u, we need to rely on the heuristics
stated by Biasse, Fieker and Jacobson [4] on the connectivity of the Caley graph
of the ideal class group when a set of edges is S = {p ∈ Poly(log(|∆|))} with
#S ≤ log(|∆|)2/3 where ∆ is the discriminant of O. By assuming [4, Heuristic
2], we state that each class of Cl(O) has a representation over the class of ideals
in S with exponents less than elog
1/3(|∆|). A quick calculation shows that there
are asymptotically many more such products than ideal classes, but their dis-
tribution is not well enough understood to conclude that all classes decompose
over S with a small enough exponent vector. Numerical experiments reported
in [4, Table 2] showed that decompositions of random ideal classes over the first
log2/3(|∆|) split primes always had exponents significantly less than elog1/3(|∆|).
Table 2. Maximal exponent occurring in short decompositions (over 1000 random
elements of the class group). Table 2 of [4].
log10(|∆|) log2/3(|∆|) Maximal coefficient elog
1/3(|∆|)
20 13 6 36
25 15 8 48
30 17 7 61
35 19 9 75
40 20 10 91
45 22 14 110
50 24 13 130
Heuristic 1 (With parameter c > 0) Let c > 0 and O an imaginary quadratic
order of discriminant ∆. Then there are (pi)i≤k for k = log2/3(|∆|) split prime
ideals of norm less than logc(|∆|) whose classes generate Cl(O). Furthermore,
each class of Cl(O) has a representative of the form ∏i pnii for |ni| ≤ elog1/3 |∆|.
A default choice for our set S could be the first log2/3(|∆|) split primes of O
(as in Table 2). We can derive our results under the weaker assumption that
the log2/3(|∆|) primes generating the ideal class group do not have to be the
first consecutive primes. Assume we know that Cl(O) is generated by at most
log2/3(|∆|) distinct classes of the split prime ideals of norm up to logc(|∆|) for
some constant c > 0. Our algorithm needs to first identify these prime ideals as
they might not be the first consecutive primes. Let p1, . . . , pk be the prime ideals
of norm up to logc(|∆|). We first compute a basis for the lattice L of vectors
(e1, . . . , ek) such that
∏
i p
ei
i is principal (in other words, the ideal class [
∏
i p
ei
i ]
is trivial). LetM be the matrix whose rows are the vectors of a basis of L. There
is a polynomial time (and space) algorithm that finds a unimodular matrix U
such that
UM = H =


h1,1 0 . . . 0
... h2,2
. . .
...
...
...
. . . 0
∗ ∗ . . . hk,k

 ,
where H is in Hermite Normal Form [32]. The matrix H represents the unique
basis of L such that hi,i > 0, and hj,j > hi,j for i > j. Every time hi,i = 1,
this means that we have a relation of the form [pi] =
[∏
j<i p
−hi,j
j
]
. In other
words, [pi] ∈ 〈[p1], . . . , [pi−1]〉. On the other hand, if hi,i 6= 1, then [pi] /∈
〈[p1], . . . , [pi−1]〉. Our algorithm proceeds by computing the HNF of M , and
every time hi,i 6= 1, it inserts pi at the beginning of the list of primes, and moves
the column i to the first column, recomputes the HNF and iterates the process.
In the end, the first log2/3(|∆|) primes in the list generate Cl(O).
Algorithm 2 Computation of log2/3(|∆|) primes that generate Cl(O)
Input: Order O of discriminant ∆ and c > 0.
Output: log2/3(|∆|) split primes whose classes generate Cl(O).
1: S ← {Split primes p1, . . . , pk of norm less than logc(|∆|)}.
2: L ← lattice of vectors (e1, . . . , ek) such that
∏
i p
ei
i is principal.
3: Compute the matrix H ∈ Zk×k of a basis of L in HNF.
4: for j = k down to log2/3(|∆|) + 1 do
5: while hj,j 6= 1 do
6: Insert pj at the beginning of S.
7: Insert the j-th column at the beginning of the list of columns of H .
8: H ← HNF(H).
9: end while
10: end for
11: return {p1, . . . , ps} for s = log2/3(|∆|).
Proposition 2. Assuming Heuristic 1 for the parameter c, Algorithm 2 is cor-
rect and runs in polynomial time in log(|∆|).
Proof. Step 2 can be done in quantum polynomial time with the S-unit algorithm
of Biasse and Song [6]. Assuming that log2/3(|∆|) primes of norm less than
logc(|∆|) generate Cl(O), the loop of Steps 5 to 9 is entered at most j times as
one of [p1], . . . , [pj ] must be in the subgroup generated by the other j − 1 ideal
classes. The HNF computation runs in polynomial time, therefore the whole
procedure runs in polynomial time. ⊓⊔
Once we have p1, . . . , ps, we compute a reduced basis B
′ of the lattice L ⊆
Zs of the vectors (e1, . . . , es) such that [
∏
i p
ei
i ] is trivial, and we compute the
Algorithm 3 Precomputation for the oracle
Input: Order O of discriminant ∆ and c > 0.
Output: Split prime ideals p1, . . . , ps whose classes generate Cl(O) where s =
log2/3(|∆|), reduced basis B′ of the lattice L of vectors (e1, . . . , es) such that[∏
i p
ei
i
]
is trivial, generators g1, . . . , gl such that Cl(O) = 〈g1〉 × · · · × 〈gl〉 and
vectors vi such that gi =
∏
j p
vi,j
j .
1: p1, . . . , ps ← output of Algorithm 2.
2: L ← lattice of vectors (e1, . . . , es) such that
∏
i p
ei
i is principal.
3: Compute a BKZ-reduced matrix B′ ∈ Zs×s of a basis of L with block size
log1/3(|∆|).
4: Compute U, V ∈ Gls(Z) such that UB′V = diag(d1, . . . , ds) is the Smith Normal
Form of B′.
5: l← mini≤s{i | di 6= 1}. For i ≤ l, vi ← i-th column of V .
6: V ′ ← V −1. For i ≤ l, gi ←
∏
j≤s p
v′i,j
j .
7: return {p1, . . . , ps}, B′, {g1, . . . , gl}, {v1, . . . , vl}.
generators g1, . . . , gl such that Cl(O) = 〈g1〉 × · · · × 〈gl〉 together with vectors
vi such that gi =
∏
j p
vi,j
j .
Lemma 1. Let L be an n-dimentional lattice with input basis B ∈ Zn×n, and
let β < n be a block size. Then the BKZ variant of [19] used with Kannan’s
enumeration technique [24] returns a basis b′1, . . . , b
′
n such that
‖b′1‖ ≤ enβ ln(β)(1+o(1))λ1 (L) ,
using time Poly(Size(B))ββ(
1
2e+o(1)) and polynomial space.
Proof. According to [19, Th. 1], ‖b′1‖ ≤ 4 (γβ)
n−1
β−1+3 λ1 (L) where γβ is the
Hermite constant in dimension β. As asymptotically γβ ≤ 1.744β2πe (1 + o(1))
(see [23]), we get that 4 (γβ)
n−1
β−1+3 ≤ enβ ln(β)(1+o(1)). Moreover, this reduc-
tion is obtained with a number of calls to Kannan’s algorithm that is bounded
by Poly(n, Size(B)). According to [20, Th. 2], each of these calls takes time
Poly(n, Size(B))ββ(
1
2e+o(1)) and polynomial space, which terminates the proof.
⊓⊔
Proposition 3. Assuming Heuristic 1 for c, Algorithm 3 is correct, runs in
time e
O˜
(
3
√
log(|∆|)
)
and has polynomial space complexity.
The precomputation of Algorithm 3 allows us to design the quantum circuit
that implements the function described in (1). Generic techniques due to Bennett
[3] convert any algorithm taking time T and space S into a reversible algorithm
taking time T 1+ǫ and space O(S logT ). From a high level point of view, this
is simply the adaptation of method of Biasse-Fieker-Jacobson [4, Alg. 7] to the
quantum setting.
Algorithm 4 Quantum oracle for implementing f defined in (1)
Input: Curves E1, E2. Order O of discriminant ∆ such that End(Ei) ≃ O for i = 1, 2.
Split prime ideals p1, . . . , ps whose classes generate Cl(O) where s = log2/3(|∆|),
reduced basis B′ of the lattice L of vectors (e1, . . . , es) such that
[∏
i p
ei
i
]
is trivial,
generators g1, . . . , gl such that Cl(O) = 〈g1〉 × · · · × 〈gl〉 and vectors vi such that
gi =
∏
j p
vi,j
j . Ideal class [ay ] ∈ Cl(O) represented by the vector y = (y1, . . . , yl) ∈
Z/d1Z× · · · × Z/dlZ ≃ Cl(O), and x ∈ Z/2Z.
Output: f(x,y).
1: y ←∑i≤l yivi ∈ Zs (now [ay ] =
[∏
i p
yi
i
]
).
2: Use Babai’s nearest plane method with the basis B′ to find u ∈ L close to y.
3: y ← y − u.
4: If x = 0 then E ← E1 else E ← E2.
5: for i ≤ s do
6: for j ≤ yi do
7: E ← [pi] ∗ E.
8: end for
9: end for
10: return |E〉.
Proposition 4. Assuming Heuristic 1 for c, Algorithm 4 is correct and runs in
quantum time e
O˜
(
3
√
log(|∆|)
)
and has polynomial space complexity.
Proof. Each group action of Step 7 is polynomial in log(p) and in N (pi). More-
over, following the arguments from the Biasse-Fieker-Jacobson method [4, Prop.
6.2], the yi are in e
O˜
(
3
√
log(|∆|)
)
, which is the cost of Steps 5 to 9. The main ob-
servation allowing us to reduce the search to a close vector to the computation
of a BKZ-reduced basis is that Heuristic 1 gives us the promise that there is
u ∈ L at distance less than e 3
√
log(|∆|)(1+o(1)) from y. ⊓⊔
Corrolary 1 Let E1, E2 be two elliptic curves and O be an imaginary quadratic
order of discriminant ∆ such that End(Ei) ≃ O for i = 1, 2. Then assuming
Heuristic 1 for some constant c > 0, there is a quantum algorithm for computing
[a] such that [a] ∗ E1 = E2 with:
– heuristic time complexity e
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
, polynomial quantum memory and
e
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
quantumly accessible classical memory,
– heuristic time complexity e
(
1√
2
+o(1)
)√
ln(|∆|) ln ln(|∆|)
with polynomial mem-
ory (both classical and quantum).
Remark 2. Heuristic 1 may be relaxed in the proof of the e
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
asymp-
totic run time. As long as a number k in O˜
(
log1−ε(|∆|)) of prime ideals of
polynomial norm generate the ideal class group and that each class has at least
one decomposition involving exponents bounded by eO˜(log
1/2−ε(|∆|)), the result
still holds by BKZ-reducing with block size β =
√
k. We refered to Heuristic 1 as
it was already present in the previous work of Biasse, Fieker and Jacobson [4].
For the poly-space variant, these conditions can be relaxed even further. It
is known under GRH that a number k in O˜ (log(|∆|)) of prime ideals of norm
less than 12 log2(|∆|) generate the ideal class group. We only need to argue that
each class can be decomposed with exponents bounded by e
O˜
(√
log(|∆|)
)
. Then
by using the oracle of Algorithm 4 with block size β =
√
k, we get a run time of
e
O˜
(√
log(|∆|)
)
with a poly-space requirement.
5 A Remark on Subgroups
It is well-known that the cost of quantum and classical attacks on isogeny based
cryptosystems is more accurately measured in the size of the subgroup generated
by the ideal classes used in the cryptosystem. As stated in [10], in order to ensure
that this is sufficiently large with high probability, the class number N must have
a large divisorM , meaning that there is a subgroup of orderM in the class group.
Assuming the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics, Hamdy and Saidak [18, Sec. 3] prove
that the smoothness probability for class numbers is essentially the same as for
random integers of the same size. Thus, for randomly-selected CSIDH system
parameters, we expect that the class number will have a large prime divisor.
It is an open problem as to whether subgroups can be exploited to reduce the
security of CSIDH, but there are nevertheless some minor considerations that
can be taken into account to minimize the risk.
Constructing system parameters for which the class number has a large
known divisor could be done by a quantum adversary using the polynomial-
time algorithm to compute the class group and trial-and-error. Using classical
computation, it is in most cases infeasible. Known methods to construct discrim-
inants for which the class number has a known divisor M use a classical result
of Nagell [26] relating the problem to finding discriminants ∆ = c2D that satisfy
c2D = a2 − 4bM for integers a, b, c. These methods thus produce discriminants
that are exponential in M , too large for practical purposes.
The one exception where classical computation can be used to find class num-
bers with a large known divisor is when the divisorM = 2k. Bosma and Steven-
hagen [8] give an algorithm, formalizing methods described by Gauss [16] and
Shanks [29], to compute the 2-Sylow subgroup of the class group of a quadratic
field. In addition to describing an algorithm that works in full generality, they
prove that the algorithm runs in expected time polynomial in log(|∆|). Using
this algorithm would enable an adversary to use trial-and-error efficiently to
generate random primes p until a sufficiently large power of 2 divides the class
number.
The primes p recommended for use with CSIDH are not amenable to this
method, because they are congruent to 3 mod 4, guaranteeing that the class
number of the non-maximal order of discriminant −4p is odd. However, in Sec-
tion 4 of [10], the authors write that they pick p ≡ 3 (mod 4) because it makes
it easy to write down a supersingular curve, but that “in principle, this con-
straint is not necessary for the theory to work”. We suggest that restricting to
primes p ≡ 3 (mod 4) is in fact necessary, in order to avoid unnecessary potential
vulnerabilities.
6 Conclusion
We described two variants of a quantum algorithm for computing an isogeny
between two elliptic curves E1, E2 defined over a finite field such that there is
an imaginary quadratic order O satisfying O ≃ End(Ei) for i = 1, 2 with ∆ =
disc(O). Our first variant runs in in heuristic asymptotic run time 2O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
and requires polynomial quantum memory and 2
O
(√
log(|∆|)
)
quantumly acces-
sible classical memory. The second variant of our algorithm relying on Regev’s
dihedral HSP solver [27] runs in time e
(
1√
2
+o(1)
)√
ln(|∆|) ln ln(|∆|)
while relying
only on polynomial (classical and quantum) memory. These variants of the HSP-
based algorithms for computing isogenies have the best asymptotic complexity,
but we left the assessment of their actual cost on specific instances such as the
proposed CSIDH parameters [10] for future work. Some of the constants involved
in lattice reduction were not calculated, and more importantly, the role of the
memory requirement should be addressed in light of the recent results on the
topic [1].
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